Inklings Forever: Published Colloquium Proceedings 1997-2016
Volume 8 A Collection of Essays Presented at
the Joint Meeting of The Eighth Frances White
Ewbank Colloquium on C.S. Lewis & Friends
and The C.S. Lewis & The Inklings Society
Conference

Article 29

5-31-2012

A Tryst with the Transcendentals: C.S. Lewis on Beauty, Truth, and
Goodness Part II: Truth
Donald T. Williams
Toccoa Falls College

Follow this and additional works at: https://pillars.taylor.edu/inklings_forever
Part of the English Language and Literature Commons, History Commons, Philosophy Commons, and
the Religion Commons

Recommended Citation
Williams, Donald T. (2012) "A Tryst with the Transcendentals: C.S. Lewis on Beauty, Truth, and Goodness
Part II: Truth," Inklings Forever: Published Colloquium Proceedings 1997-2016: Vol. 8, Article 29.
Available at: https://pillars.taylor.edu/inklings_forever/vol8/iss1/29

This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the British Author Collections at Pillars at Taylor
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Inklings Forever: Published Colloquium Proceedings 1997-2016 by
an authorized editor of Pillars at Taylor University. For more information, please contact pillars@taylor.edu.

INKLINGS FOREVER, Volume VIII
A Collection of Essays Presented at the Joint Meeting of
The Eighth
FRANCES WHITE EWBANK COLLOQUIUM ON C.S. LEWIS & FRIENDS
and
THE C.S. LEWIS AND THE INKLINGS SOCIETY CONFERENCE
Taylor University 2012
Upland, Indiana

A Tryst with the Transcendentals:
C.S. Lewis on Beauty, Truth, and Goodness
Part II: Truth

Donald T. Williams
Toccoa Falls College

Williams, Donald T. “A Tryst with the Transcendentals: C.S. Lewis on Beauty, Truth, and Goodness – Part II: Truth.”
Inklings Forever 8 (2012) www.taylor.edu/cslewis
1

A Tryst with the Transcendentals:
C.S. Lewis on Beauty, Truth, and Goodness
Part II: Truth
Donald T. Williams
Toccoa Falls College

INTRODUCTION

THE NATURE OF TRUTH

“Beauty is truth, truth beauty. That is
all / Ye know on earth, and all ye need to
know,” says Keats’ Grecian Urn. If the
Romantics tended to conflate Truth and
Beauty, the Moderns tended to explain Beauty
away as a mere subjective emotional
response; and now some Post-Moderns seem
to do the same with Truth itself. C. S. Lewis,
rooted in the classical Christian world view,
sought a more whole vision of the relations
among the Transcendentals than any of these
other approaches can provide.
As we
summarized that Christian view in part one of
this study, truth when we find it in the world
is a reflection of God’s mind, goodness of His
character, and beauty of His glory, impressed
into the very fabric of what He has made (see
Kreeft 23-5). We started with Beauty in part
one because it was Beauty, coming through
Joy, or sehnsucht, that led Lewis to Truth. But
to Truth he believed he had arrived. What
was Lewis’s view of Truth? How did he
defend it against the Reductionisms prevalent
in the middle of the Twentieth Century? Can
that defense still help us to withstand the
assaults typical of our own times? These are
the questions on which we shall attempt to
shed some light.
In our age of PostModernism and Post-Foundationalism when
the very concept of truth is subject to
deconstruction, there are hardly any more
important questions we could address.

Simply put, C. S. Lewis held to the
classical “correspondence theory” of truth:
Truth is a property of propositions such that
their content corresponds to the state of
affairs in the real and objective external
world which they assert to be so. So far Lewis
is not original in his concept of truth. His
contribution at this point is helping us to a
fuller and richer understanding of what it
means to hold such a concept.
For example, he complains,
If naturalists do not claim to know any
truths, ought they not to have warned
us rather earlier of the fact? For really
from all the books they have written, in
which the behaviour of the remotest
nebula, the shyest proton, and the most
prehistoric man are described, one
would have got the idea that they were
claiming to give us a true account of
real things. (Miracles 24).

The key words here are “account” and “real
things.” Truth is propositional; it is an
account.
The person holding to these
propositions, i.e., making this account, may
not be capable of perfect objectivity. Indeed,
if he is a finite human being, he cannot be; but
his account is an account of objective reality
nonetheless, of real things. And he can in
theory overcome his subjectivity sufficiently
to verify the truth of his account, if indeed the
nebulae, protons, and cavemen behave as his
propositions claim they do; if the state of
affairs they assert “obtains” in the real world.
2
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The theoretical possibility of thus
sufficiently overcoming our subjectivity—and
knowing when we have done so—is then
essential to our ability to perceive, know, and
state truth as correspondence. Traditional
philosophy and nihilistic Post-Modernism
actually agree on this point; they part
company on the question of whether that
possibility exists. Lewis argues that it has to:
The reason why your idea of New York
can be truer or less true than mine is
that New York is a real place, existing
quite apart from what either of us
thinks. If, when each of us said “New
York” each meant merely “The town I
am imagining in my own head,” how
could one of us have truer ideas than
the other? There would be no question
of truth or falsehood at all. (Mere
Christianity 25)

Post-Kantian relativism, before we
even arrive at Post-Structuralism and
Deconstruction, holds that the real objective
New York, the New York an sich, is
unreachable, and that therefore only the
phenomenal New York, the one that exists as
an image constructed in our heads, can be
directly known. Common sense would seem
to be on the side of Lewis and the older
Tradition, though; for there actually is a real
New York, and the simple expedient of
visiting it can determine which of two
accounts of it is closer to the reality, so that
the town being imagined in one head can be
rejected in favor of that being imagined in the
other for good and sufficient reason—to wit,
the town existing outside of either head. Is
Times Square in Manhattan, Brooklyn,
Queens, Staten Island, or the Bronx? Unless
the real New York outside our heads both
exists and is accessible to our heads, the
question is unanswerable. But the question is
in fact answerable; therefore, truth must be
what Lewis conceived it to be, an account of
New York that is theoretically capable of
getting what we think closer to the real place
that exists quite apart from what any of us
thinks.

The existence of truth in this sense
entails the existence of falsehood.
Of
contradictory propositions, only one of them
can be true, and if that one is true, the other
must perforce be false.
“Your Hindus
certainly sound delightful,” Lewis wrote to
Dom Bede Griffiths, “But what do they deny?
That’s always been my trouble with Indians—
to find any proposition they would pronounce
false.
But truth surely must involve
exclusions?” (Letters 3:704). A precondition
of truth then is the universal validity of the
law of non-contradiction. Two contradictory
propositions cannot both be true in the same
way, in the same place, at the same time. If
they could, the claim that either was true
would be empty.
In other words, a true thought
“reflects,” not just the mind of the thinker, but
“universal reality” (“De Futilitate” 60).
“Christianity claims to give you an account of
facts—to tell you what the real universe is
like” (“Man or Rabbit?” 108). One who claims
anything less is simply not claiming that
Christianity (or any other account of the state
of things) is true.
The radical nature of this concern for
truth was apparent already by the middle of
the Twentieth Century, as can be seen by
looking at some of the typical academic
concerns of late Modernism with which Lewis
contrasts it.
What makes some theological works
like sawdust to me is the way the
authors can go on discussing how far
certain positions are adjustable to
contemporary thought, or beneficial in
relation to social problems, or “have a
future” before them, but never squarely
ask what grounds we have for
supposing them to be true accounts of
any objective reality. (Malcolm 104)

Screwtape encourages Wormwood to make
good use of such an intellectual climate:
Your man has been accustomed, ever
since he was a boy, to have a dozen
incompatible philosophies dancing
about together inside his head. He
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doesn’t think of doctrines as primarily
“true” or “false,” but as “academic” or
“practical,”
“outworn”
or
“contemporary,” “conventional” or
“ruthless.” Jargon, not argument, is
your best ally in keeping him from the
Church. Don’t waste time trying to
make him think materialism is true!
Make him think it is strong or stark or
courageous—that it is the philosophy
of the future. (Screwtape 8)

In the intellectual climate which we
have at last succeeded in producing
throughout western Europe, you
needn’t bother about that [the fact that
earlier writers like Boethius had told
the truth]. Only the learned read old
books, and we have now so dealt with
the learned that they are of all men the
least likely to acquire wisdom by doing
so. . . . When a learned man is presented
with any statement in an ancient
author, the one question he never asks
is whether it is true. He asks who
influenced the ancient writer, and how
far the statement is consistent with
what he said in other books, and what
phase in the writer’s development, or in
the general history of thought it
illustrates, and how it affected later
writers, and how often it has been
misunderstood . . . and what the course
of criticism has been on it for the last
ten years, and what is the “present
state of the question.” (Screwtape 1289)

Now in the Post-Modern world we
have added concerns for what racial, class, or
gendered interests the ideas in question
advance, how they fit into or illustrate the
power-broking structures of society, etc. It is
not that these questions, or the ones Lewis
noticed (which are still with us), are always
devoid of interest, legitimacy, or relevance.
They become problematic when they are
used as a substitute for the search for truth, a
way of endlessly deferring the question of
truth, which is thought to be unattainable
anyway. And that is precisely how they often

do function, not surprisingly given that
Derrida correctly realized that once the very
possibility of truth has been banished, the
“play of signification” is extended precisely to
infinity (1207).
Here is the point: Lewis would want
to ask of the claim that, by the very nature of
discourse, questions of truth are endlessly
deferred, “Is it true? Does it correspond to
the way things actually are in the real world?”
And this is a question that Derrida, for
example, would have had to refuse to answer;
it is a question that simply has no meaning in
his system. If we accepted the Deconstructive
analysis, we would have to limit ourselves to
questions of race, gender, class, and power
too, for the truth question would be
unaskable. So the question whether a view of
truth can itself be true (or false) turns out to
be pretty basic. Can we correct the New York
in our heads by the one in the American
Northeast, or are we rendered unable to do
so, trapped inside our heads, whether by
Kantian categories or by the specious
language games preferred by Post-Modern
intellectuals? Putting off for the moment a
field trip to the Big Apple, we can realize that
there is no question as to which side of that
divide Lewis occupied.
Not all people who have held the
correspondence theory of truth have been
theists. But Christian theism if accepted does
provide a solid grounding for such a view of
truth. If we believe in a personal and rational
God who not only acts but speaks, and who
has created our finite minds in His image,
then it is easier to conceive of truth as both
existing and knowable. There is a stable
reality to which our propositions can
correspond, and our minds were designed to
deal with that reality by the same Mind that
designed it. If God exists and has spoken,
then He is Himself the ultimate source of
truth, and His Word the ultimate criterion of
truth. The complaint that there is no “God’s
eye view of the world” is then simply based
on a false premise. There is one; God has it;
and He has communicated at least some parts
of it to us. All truth then comes from Him,
either directly or indirectly. Lewis of course
4

A Tryst with the Transcendentals · Donald T. Williams

lived comfortably in this world: “Whatever
was true in Akhenaton’s creed came to him, in
some mode or other, as all truth comes to all
men, from God” (Reflections 86).
So far Lewis is solidly in the
mainstream of Christian thinking about truth.
Augustine and Aquinas, Calvin and Wesley,
Cardinal Newman and Carl F. H. Henry would
all have affirmed these basic points, though
not perhaps with Lewis’s characteristically
deft use of apt analogy. What Lewis adds to
the discussion is some careful thinking about
the relations of truth not only to reason but
also to imagination. It was his experience and
his conviction that “All things, in their way,
reflect heavenly truth, imagination not least”
(Surprised 167).
How exactly does
imagination do so?
Some
of
Lewis’s
interpreters,
influenced
perhaps
by
the
surface
resemblance in language between Lewis and
the English Romantics, have not paid
sufficiently careful attention to how Lewis
answers that question. One reads vague
statements like “Truth flows into a person
through the imagination” (Uszynski 247) and
even more inexact summaries like the
following: “Lewis, like many Romantics,
intuitively trusted the capacity of imagination
to be a ‘faculty of truth’” (Tixier 141). What
Lewis actually said was much more carefully
and rigorously thought out:
We are not talking about truth but
meaning: meaning which is the
antecedent condition of both truth and
falsehood, whose antithesis is not error
but nonsense. I am a rationalist. For
me, reason is the natural organ of truth;
but imagination is the organ of
meaning. Imagination, producing new
metaphors or revivifying old, is not the
cause of truth, but its condition.
(“Bluspels” 265).

Imagination is the faculty or organ not
of truth (directly) but of meaning, which is
the “antecedent condition” of truth. What
does this mean?
Suppose I utter the
proposition, “Blepple hloisats kleply flarg
krunk bluzzles,” and then ask you for a

verdict on its truth or falsehood. I suspect
you would be somewhat handicapped in
trying to render that verdict by the fact that
you would have no idea what I had said.
Before you could even begin to form a
judgment on the truth question, you would
need to know what a hloisat is, how a blepple
one differs from a regular one, what it is to
flarg, what a bluzzle is, what is the quality of
krunkness, and how flarging kleply differs
from regular flarging. In order to give you
that information I would have to render these
objects, qualities, and actions in concrete
terms that you could visualize.
Your
Imagination would be the faculty that enabled
you to form a picture—an image—of what the
proposition is asserting (or whether it is
asserting anything). Then your Reason would
compare that mental picture to the picture of
reality it has already tested and come to trust,
in order to see if correspondence or
contradiction resulted.
Imagination, in other words, doesn’t
give us truth, contrary to what Tixier implies.
Just because we can imagine something does
not make it real. But Imagination combined
with Reason can give us meaningful truth,
truth that impacts us on other levels than
mere academic intellectual assent. This is
truth that can appeal to head and heart
together. Lewis was the master of giving it to
us, whether in his expository prose or his
fiction. The hall and rooms of a house for the
church and its denominations; two books
which have always been resting one on the
other for the eternal generation of the Son;
the keys of a piano and a tune for the
relationship between our instincts and the
moral law; entrusting oneself to the waves
and floating islands of Perelandra rather than
sleeping on the fixed land for faith; the Stone
Table for the Law and Aslan’s death cracking
it for the Gospel; Reepicheep the Mouse for
valor, chivalry, and honor: The brilliant
artistic construction of these images does not
prove that they are images of truth. But their
presence in the context of the linear
arguments and narrative trajectories of which
they are a part makes the truths established
by those lines of development mean
5
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something; it makes their impact, their
beauty, and their relevance easier to see and
to feel.
Mythology for Lewis was one of the
most
important
places
where
this
contribution of imagination to our ability to
grasp the meaning of true (or false)
propositions is seen. It is well known that for
Lewis myth was not the opposite of truth, as
it is in popular usage, but rather one way in
which truth can be conveyed or embodied.
Myth is not necessarily “lies breathed through
silver” (as the pre-conversion Lewis once
foolishly said to Tolkien), but can be “a real
though unfocused gleam of divine truth
falling on human imagination” (Tolkien 54;
Lewis, Miracles 139n.). Myth may then
convey these truths to the imaginations of
readers, who might then independently verify
them through reason and hence validly accept
them as true. Thus George MacDonald’s
modern mythic stories helped move Lewis in
the direction of Christian faith by giving a
meaning to the concept of holiness, even as
Lewis’s own stories have done for countless
readers since. The mythical quality of the
story refers in Lewis’s usage to its
meaningfulness rather than its truth or
falsehood as such, which must be established
on other grounds. Hence Lewis could without
contradiction refer to the New Testament
story of Jesus’ birth, death, and resurrection
as “myth become fact” (67).
Lewis is careful to use this language
correctly even in his fiction. “Long since on
Mars, and more strongly since he came to
Perelandra, Ransom had been perceiving that
the triple distinction of truth from myth and
both from fact was purely terrestrial—was
part and parcel of that unhappy division
between soul and body that resulted from the
Fall” (Perelandra 143-4, cf. “Myth Became
Fact” 66). Fact in this passage is the bit of
reality that truth is about; truth the account
that corresponds to that reality; myth the
story that allows us to taste the particular
tang of that fact (“Myth Became Fact” 66).
Ransom experiences in Perelandra the preanalytical unity that lies behind the
distinguished categories.

When one is inside a myth, in other
words—say, on Perelandra with Ransom—
one experiences the unified reality from
which all three flow. When talking about that
experience later, one has perforce to use the
distinguished language, and Lewis does so
consistently. He was doing so even in his
earliest Christian fiction: “Child, if you will, it
is mythology. It is but truth, not fact; an
image, not the very real” (Regress 171). A
true statement about reality is not reality; not
even a mythical statement is reality; but it
may be true nonetheless, i.e., it may
correspond to that reality in a faithful
manner. Because the meaningful creating
and sustaining acts of a personal, purposeful,
and rational God are the ultimate source of all
reality, there is indeed a real unity between
fact and truth, and between both and myth,
the most meaningful statement of truth.
Wolfe captures it well: “Ransom’s education
has led him to see that it is not merely the
idyllic worlds of Malacandra and Perelandra
which are ‘mythological,’ but that reality
itself, when perceived truly, is as dense with
meaning as myth” (Wolfe 68). And some of
this meaning may be stated propositionally,
and some of those propositions may be
confirmed by Reason as true.
Lewis then embraces the traditional
and standard correspondence theory of truth
and enriches it by relating truth to
imagination and myth. Truth is a property of
accounts or propositions such that their
assertions
correspond
with
reality.
Imagination is the organ of meaning, the
antecedent condition of truth or falsehood,
i.e., of the meaningfulness of those accounts
claiming to be true or false. Reason, which
distinguishes and discerns correspondence or
non-correspondence
(between
those
propositions and each other, between them
and reality) and pursues their implications, is
the organ of truth. Myth is a story that
enables the imagination to receive and taste
ways of seeing the world that reason can then
confirm as true or false.
This view of truth, traditional and
standard, was already under attack in Lewis’s
6
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own day, and that attack has only intensified
since. How did he defend it?
THE DEFENSE OF TRUTH

Above we raised the question
whether a view of truth can itself be true. It is
time to see how Lewis answered that
question in the case of the correspondence
theory of truth. He gives two basic reasons
why we should accept the correspondence
theory of truth as true. First, it cannot be
denied without self contradiction. Second, it
corresponds to the way in which people do in
fact come to true knowledge about the world.
Lewis advanced the argument from
self contradiction in many ways and in many
contexts. The most well known and fully
developed place is the chapter of Miracles
originally titled “The Self Contradiction of the
Naturalist.” Attempts to answer technical
objections raised by Elizabeth Anscombe
when the argument was presented at the
Oxford Socratic Club caused the water in that
chapter to be muddied a bit in later editions,
with the title changing to the “Cardinal
Difficulty” of Naturalism. Either way, the
argument is that Naturalism must itself be
false because it participates in the inevitable
self-refutation of all views that entail radical
skepticism. (See Reppert for a fine history
and evaluation of the Anscombe debate.)
A good summation of the argument
appears in the essay “De Futilitate”:
Can we carry through to the end the
view that human thought is merely
human: that it is simply a zoological
fact about homo sapiens that he thinks
in a certain way; that it in no way
reflects . . . universal reality? The
moment we ask this question we
receive a check. We are at this very
point asking whether a certain view of
human thought is true. And the view in
question is just the view that human
thought is not true, not a reflection of
reality. . . . In other words, we are
asking, “Is the thought that no thoughts
are true, itself true?” If we answer Yes,
we contradict ourselves. . . . There is

therefore no question of a total
skepticism about human thought. (“De
Futilitate” 60-61)

If true statements do not correspond to real
states of affairs in the external world, if they
are not “reflections of reality,” then the very
claim that truth is not a reflection of reality
does not correspond to the way things
actually are either, and thus it self-destructs.
This is so whether the reason why we
allegedly cannot know that some statements
accurately reflect reality is the physical
determinism entailed by naturalism (Lewis’s
opponent in Miracles), the cynicism of the
Greek sophists, or the linguistic solipsism of
Post-Modern Deconstructionists.
Lewis’s usual foil was naturalism. If
Nature is all that there is, then the laws of
physics—not the laws of logic—determine
everything. The thoughts I am having are
mere chemical reactions taking place in my
head, determined solely by the movements of
atoms set in random motion by purposeless
and unintelligent processes ages ago. But,
then, so are the thoughts of the person who
disagrees with me. “What we called his
thought was essentially a phenomenon of the
same sort as his other secretions—the form
which the vast irrational process of nature
was bound to take at a particular point of
space and time” (“Religion without Dogma”
136). Who is to decide between these two
chemical reactions? A third chemical reaction
produced by the same random, purposeless
processes? This takes us nowhere. So Lewis
quotes J. B. S. Haldane: “If my mental
processes are determined wholly by the
motions of atoms in my brain, I have no
reason to suppose that my beliefs are true . . .
and hence I have no reason for supposing my
brain to be composed of atoms” (Miracles 22).
Lewis agreed. If naturalism were true, it
would be have to be false. For if it is true,
then
All our present thoughts are mere
accidents—the accidental by-product of
the movement of atoms. And this holds
for the thoughts of the materialists and
astronomers as well as for anyone
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else’s. But if their thoughts—i.e., of
Materialism
and
Astronomy—are
merely accidental by-products, whey
should we believe them to be true? I
see no reason for believing that one
accident should be able to give me a
correct account of all the other
accidents. (“Answers” 52-3)

It follows then that

At least one kind of thought—logical
thought—cannot be subjective and
irrelevant to the real universe: for
unless thought is valid we have no
reason to believe in the real universe. . .
. I conclude then that logic is a real
insight into the way in which real
things have to exist. In other words,
the laws of thought are the laws of
things. (“De Futilitate” 63)

That thought be logical is a necessary
but not a sufficient condition of truth that is
known to be truth. A proposition that
someone holds may just happen to be true; it
may be true by luck. But unless it has a
logical basis, we cannot know it to be true.
And a proposition may be logically consistent
or coherent without corresponding to
external reality. To maintain a belief in
knowable truth, in other words, we must have
more than logic but cannot have less. Thus
we can be certain that “No account of the
universe can be true unless that account
leaves it possible for our thinking to be a real
insight” (Miracles 20).
The correspondence theory of truth
itself then is not only logically consistent; it is
logically necessary if there is to be any
knowable truth at all.
Furthermore, it
matches the way people actually come to
discover and hold truth. How do we actually
come to know truth? The additional element
that we have to add to logic is experience.
There is a real New York that transcends any
of our perceptions of New York (the New
York “in my own head” that we saw above)
and is capable of correcting those perceptions
and adjudicating between them. If we do not

know which picture of the city is more
accurate, we can go and look.
But can we really? Post-Modern
theory argues that we cannot step outside of
our perceptions to experience the New York
an sich because the perception we receive
through experience is itself mediated through
our background, our beliefs, our language,
and our situatedness. There is no such thing
as uninterpreted experience; any experience
to which we might appeal has already been
interpreted, so that there is no “God’s eye
view” from which our perceptions can be
evaluated and no final conclusion that can be
reached about what reality is in itself outside
our perceptions. As Derrida famously put it,
“There is nothing outside the text.”
Was Lewis then caught in a naïve
Modernism so that his appeals to reason and
experience are simply passé? He never had
the opportunity to respond to thinkers like
Derrida, of course. But he was confronted by
earlier forms of cultural and epistemological
relativism, and so we can easily imagine what
his response might have been.
Radical
skepticism is no less self refuting when it is
based on clever theories about language than
when it is based on philosophical or scientific
naturalism. It cannot be true without
untruthing itself; therefore, it cannot be true.
In the case of Post-Modern forms of this
sophistry, Lewis might have noted the
prevalence of reductionistic thinking. The
demonstration that we cannot avoid having
our thinking influenced by our language, race,
gender, class, etc., is mysteriously elevated
(while no one is looking) into the conclusion
that our thinking must perforce be
determined by those influences. The fact that
we normally define language by using other
language is extrapolated into the theory that
language only refers to other language and
has no ability to refer to anything outside of
language. But as Smith points out,
Language . . . is the only means we have
of making truth claims. Likewise, it is
the only means we have of debating the
veracity of such claims. Unless we wish
to give over the entire business of

8
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making and challenging claims to truth,
we must accept the referentiality of
language, metaphoricity and all.
Otherwise, we must be ready to admit
that statements such as “Metaphor is
nonreferential” do not refer to anything
except themselves.
Such would
probably be the starting point of any
defense Lewis might make of the
referentiality of metaphor. (22).

Can the real New York ever, even
potentially, break through all these influences
to smack us in the face with reality? Our
experience tells us that, whatever the dictates
of Theory to the contrary may be, in fact it
can, if we just step out of the ivory tower into
the street.
Lewis’s attitude toward
experience, and toward the external world
which provides us with those experiences, is
therefore quite refreshing compared to the
suffocating claustrophobia of much current
thinking:
What I like about experience is that it is
such an honest thing. You may take any
number of wrong turnings; but keep
your eyes open and you will not be
allowed to go very far before the
warning signs appear. You may have
deceived yourself, but experience is not
trying to deceive you. The universe
rings true wherever you fairly test it.
(Surprised 177)

Truth then is a property of
propositions such that they correspond to
real states of affairs in a real world. We hold
to this view because to deny it is self refuting
and because reality rewards us in the search
for truth in such terms when we approach it
fairly. One must assume these truths even to
argue against them. And the best response to
those theories that seem to compromise or
deny them is not just counter-theorizing, but
stepping outside of the ivory tower into the
street to allow the real New York to do its
work.

THE RELEVANCE OF TRUTH
Lewis not only expounds the
correspondence theory of truth, enriches it by
relating it to imagination as well as reason,
and defends it successfully; he also has a lot
to say about its implications for life and
thought.
First, if we are confident in the
existence of truth and the ability of human
minds to know it, we are liberated from
chronological snobbery. We are freed from
the provincialism of the biases of our own age
to become citizens of history and receive
truth from any mind in any time, not just
those who share the perspectives of our own
limited “situatedness.” “Space does not stink
because it has preserved its three dimensions
from the beginning. The square of the
hypotenuse has not gone mouldy by
continuing to equal the square of the other
two sides” (“Poison” 76). Truth becomes
something we can find and hold on to. Only if
it is reduced to perspective does it change
into something else by the mere passage of
time.
Second, it is impossible fully to
understand human nature or to seek its
fulfillment without a robust understanding of
the nature of truth and confidence in its
reality. In The Abolition of Man, human
beings are those creatures who live not by
instinct but by understanding of the Tao.
Lewis agreed with Aristotle that all men
naturally desire to know: “One of the things
that distinguishes man from the other
animals is that he wants to know things,
wants to find out what reality is like, simply
for the sake of knowing. When that desire is
completely quenched in anyone, I think he
has become something less than human”
(“Man or Rabbit?” 108).
A human being divorced from the
quest for truth is less than human because
human beings were created in the image of
the God of truth, for fellowship with the God
of truth, which entails not just the knowledge
but also the embracing of truth and the
rejection of the lie. This fact makes our
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orientation toward truth a matter not just of
fulfillment but of moral obligation.
When Professor Price defended
scientists, speaking of their devotion to
truth and their constant following of
the best light they knew, it seemed to
him that he was choosing an attitude in
obedience to an ideal. He did not feel
that he was merely suffering a reaction
determined by ultimately amoral and
irrational sources, and no more capable
of rightness or wrongness than a hiccup
or a sneeze. (“Religion without Dogma”
137)

Lewis approves of this stance, even though
Price may not have realized that his attitude
ultimately flows from the relation of the
creature to the Creator who is the God of
truth. It is the duty of true humanity to feel
this way: “Every free man wants truth as well
as life: . . . a mere life-addict is no more
respectable than a cocaine addict” (Miracles
24).
Therefore, to acquiesce in the mere
freeplay of perspectives rather than pursuing
the search for truth is to betray the purpose
for which our minds were created. In a
passage that prophetically anticipates a PostModern buzz word, the liberal bishop in The
Great Divorce is warned, “Thirst was made for
water; inquiry for truth. What you now call
the free play of inquiry has neither more nor
less to do with the ends for which intelligence
was given you than masturbation has to do
with marriage” (44). The choice of metaphor
is not only daring but telling. Truth was
intended to be experienced not just as an
intellectual abstraction but as a participation
in reality that has union with the ultimate
Reality, the Source of all reality, as its end.
The rejection of truth is finally a rejection of
that union, a form of spiritual adultery. Every
philosophy that reduces truth to merely a
subjective mind state dehumanizes us and
cuts us off not only from God, but from all that
is good and real. As the George MacDonald
character in The Great Divorce explains,
“Every state of mind, left to itself, every
shutting up of the creature within the

dungeon of his own mind—is, in the end, Hell.
But Heaven is not a state of mind. Heaven is
reality itself” (Great Divorce 69). The Dwarfs
in The Last Battle, clinging to the stable-litter
of their minds, are a graphic picture of this
epistemological captivity.
Flowing from all this is a third point:
Seeking and finding and embracing the truth
is not a matter just of intellectual curiosity
but of moral and spiritual life and death. The
importance of truth cannot be overstated in
this view. And because truth flows from the
creative decrees of the spiritual God who
created the material world, the true
propositions whose embrace is so crucial to
us correspond not just to physical reality but
to the unseen realities, to morals and values,
as well. This means that, as in the argument
of The Abolition of Man, morals and values are
objective realities, not just subjective feelings
or perspectives. Therefore, “Unless we return
to the crude and nursery-like belief in
objective values, we perish” (“Poison” 81).
The most critical truth to be
embraced or refused is of course the truth
about the God from whom the world of reality
flows. Every person therefore has a moral
obligation to consider the claims of the
Christian faith very seriously—whether or
not he or she sees any immediate pragmatic
benefit in holding those beliefs. This above all
is not a merely academic discussion.
Christianity claims to give you an
account of facts—to tell you what the
real universe is like. Its account of the
universe may be true, or it may not, and
once the question is really before you,
then your natural inquisitiveness must
make you want to know the answer. If
Christianity is untrue, then no honest
man will want to believe it, however
helpful it might be; if it is true, every
honest man will want to believe it, even
if it gives him no help at all. (“Man or
Rabbit?” 108-9)

Truth comes before any use we might
make of it, and we find it only when we
recognize that fact. “If you look for truth, you
may find comfort in the end. If you look for
10
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comfort, you will not get either comfort or
truth—only soft soap and wishful thinking to
begin with, and in the end, despair” (Mere
Christianity 39). Though the search for truth
is a value in itself that supersedes any
pragmatic benefit that might come from
finding it, there is of course pragmatic benefit
to knowing and embracing the truth: comfort,
perhaps, and more important things besides.
“If Christianity should happen to be true, then
it is quite impossible that those who know
this truth and those who don’t should be
equally well equipped for leading a good life”
(“Man or Rabbit?” 109).
But there is
something even greater at stake than how
good a life we might lead:
Here is a door, behind which, according
to some people, the secret of the
universe is waiting for you. Either
that’s true, or it isn’t. And if it isn’t,
then what the door really conceals is
simply the greatest fraud, the most
colossal “sell,” on record.
Isn’t it
obviously the job of every man (that is
a man and not a rabbit) to try to find
out which, and then to devote his full
energies either to serving this
tremendous secret or to exposing and
destroying this gigantic humbug?
(“Man or Rabbit?” 112)

Lewis devoted his life to “serving this
tremendous secret,” to living, explaining, and
defending the Christian faith. The fourth
implication of Lewis’s view of truth as he
develops it is what it means for living the
Christian life. To believe in truth and take it
seriously is to make the quest for truth
paramount not only in deciding to become a
Christian, but also in those decisions one
makes because one is a Christian—for
example, the choice of a church or a
denomination. Applying his analogy of the
church as a house with its hall and rooms,
Lewis advises, “Above all you should be
asking which door is the true one; not which
pleases you best by its paint and paneling. In
plain language, the question should never be:
‘Do I like that kind of service?’ but ‘Are these
doctrines true?’” (Mere Christianity 12).

If truth is central to what Christianity
is, then we have to understand the central
Christian act—belief—in terms of our
concept of truth. Faith becomes something
oriented to truth, a stance one takes toward
the truth. If this is so, it becomes harder to
think of faith as a primarily emotional
response, or as unrelated to specific
propositions about God and the world, or as
the inclination to affirm as true propositions
that would otherwise not commend
themselves as such. Faith is trust in a Person
which causes us, not merely to acknowledge,
but to embrace as true, those ideas and facts
about that Person which we have come to
believe (in Lewis’s case, on what he thought
were good grounds) that He has revealed to
us. Faith adds the emotional and personal
element of trust and commitment to what
would otherwise be a merely notional
relationship to those propositions. That is
why Lewis can say, “I define Faith as the
power of continuing to believe what we once
honestly thought to be true until cogent
reasons for honestly changing our minds are
brought before us” (“Religion: Reality or
Substitute?” 42). He devotes an entire essay,
“On Obstinacy in Belief,” to explaining this
relational element as the reason why the
Christian’s belief, once established, does not
waver with “every fluctuation of the apparent
evidence” (29). For one who holds Lewis’s
classical view of truth, then, faith is
something that is more than propositional
and evidential, but it can never be less.
Faith then is a stance toward certain
propositions seen in relation to the Person
who is believed to have revealed them, which
embraces them as true not as a matter of
opinion but of trust and commitment. The
lack of evidence is not what constitutes this
stance as belief or faith rather than
knowledge. Lewis (and many others) have
thought the evidence quite good. But the fact
that the particular relationship to which these
beliefs lead and which they nurture is the
rather overwhelming and life-changing one of
creature to Creator, sinner to Savior, and
servant to absolute Sovereign—a relationship
infinitely satisfying to many who embrace it
11

A Tryst with the Transcendentals · Donald T. Williams

but daunting enough in prospect to have
caused Lewis to describe his conversion as
being dragged kicking and screaming into the
Kingdom—means that there is a lot more
going on than the mere disinterested perusal
of evidence. There are many more sources
for doubt than lack of irrefutable evidence.
So Lewis can see faith as the support of
reason as much as the other way around:
Religion may win truths; without Faith
she will retain them just so long as
Satan pleases. . . . If we wish to be
rational, not now and then, but
constantly, we must pray for the gift of
Faith, for the power to go on believing
not in the teeth of reason but in the
teeth of lust and terror and jealousy
and boredom and indifference that
which reason, authority, or experience,
or all three, have once delivered to us
for truth.
(“Religion: Reality or
Substitute” 43)

Truth then for the Christian is a
serious intellectual matter that can never be
only intellectual. It is at the heart of our
created humanity and of its fulfillment in
relationship to its Creator. In a healthy and
whole human being, truth simultaneously
informs the intellect, inspires the emotions,
and energizes the will. Lewis would have
understood Bacon:
The inquiry of truth, which is the
lovemaking or wooing of it, the
knowledge of truth, which is the
presence of it, and the belief of truth,
which is the enjoying of it, is the
sovereign good of human nature. . . .
Certainly it is heaven upon earth to
have a man’s mind move in charity, rest
in providence, and turn upon the poles
of truth. (Bacon 40)

It is not just reason and imagination that are
unified by Lewis’s holistic view of truth; it is
head and heart, being and doing, and every
other aspect of our humanity as well. That
unity is well expressed by Lewis’s final bit of
advice: “A man can’t always be defending the
truth; there must be a time to feed on it”

(Reflections 7). In his fiction, his poetry, and
his expository writing, Lewis helps us to do
just that.
CONCLUSION

C. S. Lewis’s exposition of truth, its
nature, its grounds, and its implications, is
increasingly a voice crying in a wilderness of
radical perspectivalism. Various forms of
reductionism today conspire to render truth
claims nothing more than subjective
responses and cynical power plays. Sadly, so
pervasive is this way of thinking, so cloaked
in the robes of academic sophistication and
respectability, that even some Christians have
inconsistently acquiesced in such views and
helped to perpetuate them. Lewis can help us
see what is at stake as well as provide a
roadmap back to sanity.
The materialist reductionism Lewis
battled is still with us. Reppert, for example,
critiques thinkers like Patricia Churchland
who think that evolutionary explanations of
the nervous system render the concept of
truth otiose: “Either truth is our highest
epistemic goal and there is a state of the
person called ‘believing truly,’ or else we have
no epistemic goal and we can engage in
various cognitive projects without being held
to an absolute standard by which those
projects can be judged” (77).
To that
materialist reductionism have now been
added other forms of cultural and linguistic
reductionism with similar or even more
deadly effects. Edwards notes,
Some recent composition theorists
have come to view their task as
stripping away the illusions that
language can capture and bear witness
to “truth” or “reality.” . . . The purpose
of writing instruction under the new
literacy regimes is to prepare the
writer to recognize and inhabit the
world of “truths” that he himself
creates, as opposed to the world of
truths he might discover outside
himself. . . . Lewis would regard these
views as a retreat to a Gnosticism that
not only does not shield humankind
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from manipulation or error, but instead
guarantees error by undermining the
ontological status of knowledge and
belief. (103)

Those who still aspire to the
wholeness of an examined life and connection
to a reality greater than themselves will find
in Lewis a stout defender of the legitimacy
and necessity of that quest, and an
experienced guide to lead us in it. Is truth
when we find it in the world a reflection of
God’s mind, goodness of His character, and
beauty of His glory, impressed into the very
fabric of what He has made? C. S. Lewis not
only explains why we should think so; he lets
us taste and see.
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